[FPSPACE] Report: North Korea ICBM test--missile used copy of RD-250 rocket engine

John Pike john at globalsecurity.org
Mon Jul 10 09:38:45 EDT 2017

At 04:36 PM 7/9/2017, jameseoberg at comcast.net wrote:
>  interdiction was a failure, and mostly for show.

as one of the leading proponents of space cooperation for
non-proliferation at the time, let me try to rescue my reputation

1 - It seemed like a good idea at the time, and had both political
and non-proliferation components - the political [the Cold War
is really over] was the more important, and it worked.
The Plan B [keeping the human spaceflight enterprise going
in the event of another Shuttle accident] also worked

2 - it could have been much worse - rather than a trickle from
Miass there could have been an avalanche from the entirety of
General Machine-Building [in which case by now we might
be worried about ICBMs from Zimbabwe, which is at present
under heavier sanctions than the DPRK]

3 - James is correct that the enterprises that were mainly
working on ISS had gotten out of the missile business some time
earlier, but the overall policy was also to facilitate Russian entry
into the SLV business, and Makaeyev [the chiefest culprit in the
case of the DPRK] was interested in that line of work [without
much in the way of success].  Yuzhnoye managed to swing
both ways, and all the others tried. But the issue was not just
the NPOs and OKBs, it was also the people, who were a bit
more fungible

4 - more generally on the space/missile walk across, if one
looks at the OCD application of MTCR to India on LOX/LH2 upper
stage, the USG position was that they were completely fungible

5 - At the time, I  saw this as a missile counterpart to the nuclear
Nunn-Lugar, which would have made sense from a non-proliferation
perspective. I was a voice crying in the wilderness. The nuclear
non-proliferation crowd at DOE/DoD didn't see it that way, and
pretty much thought that non-proliferation only involved
14MeV neutrons [that is, non-proliferation was nuclear]

6 - But at least the agencies who owned nuclear non-proliferation
actually owned that account. NASA did not own missile non-proliferation
and was too busy with Cheaper/Faster/Better[tm] to worry about it,
and the fine folks at State who worried about missile proliferation
were of the  view that they had solved that problem with MTCR,
so the policy was an institutional orphan,

7 - Nunn-Lugar did not pose a threat to the American Military
Industrial Complex, but space cooperation with the Russians did
seem to pose a threat to the American Space Industrial Complex.
In Congress, at least the Armed Services Committees gave some
attention to the national interest, whereas the space Appropriators
had long ago been captured by industry.

8 - Carl Sagan made sure I did not get the Space Council job,
so I could not argue for a policy of broader engagement from
within the Administration [fortuately for me, since I would not
have been happy in that job, and my subsequently life would
have taken a turn for the worse, so it was one of the best
things that ever happened to me - bad for the world, maybe,
but  good for me, for sure]. So I remained a voice crying
in the wilderness

9 - it is surely more complex than this, but these are some
of the main points as I saw them

10 - as Keynes said, in the long run, we are all dead

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